ECW Campaign - Activation Again - Crude but OK

In my recent Battle of High Cark (previous post), I had another example of a medium-sized action which did not lay out nicely in the official play-across-the-table, left-centre-right sector format which best suits Commands & Colors. In fact, the battle did sort itself into across-the-table, but it might not have done.

Since it was also a solo game, there were a couple of reasons why I decided for this occasion to swerve my customised ECW set of C&C Command Cards for activation. I’ve done this on occasions in the past, usually replacing the cards with a semi-improvised dice system to fit the scenario. These systems have all worked tolerably well – my personal view on each of them is based on very short, Stone Age-man criteria.

(1) Does it restrict the number of activated units to about the right level (i.e. something comparable with what the C&C cards would give)?

(2) Is the extra overhead of labour and mental arithmetic acceptable, in view of the advantages offered (i.e. is it a pain in the butt)?

(3) Does it make sense (i.e. can it be explained in sensible, real-world terms, or is it just an obviously artificial game mechanism to limit each move)?

Dice manufacture in the Stone Age - lack of a numbering system was a major problem

Point (1) is simply that C&C provides the player with a hand of cards (usually the cards he doesn’t want), of which he may play one – typically, the sector cards allow activation of between 1 and 4 units, though some allow activation of a number of units equal to the number of cards in the player's hand. This gives an approximate idea of how much activation is appropriate for tested use with C&C’s movement and combat rules, and with the required (short) duration of each turn, to keep things ticking along.

Point (2) is obviously also about keeping the game moving, and a personal aversion I have to command radii (which, of course, are loved and embraced by a great many players whose views and opinions I respect). I have had unhappy flirtations with caches of Command Chips and similar – as soon as they become a nuisance, the Activation rules are abandoned, and I use tasteful application of Point (3) to justify this.

My latest improvisation came after reading some of Neil Thomas’ rules. It does not appear in any of Neil’s books as far as I know, but I find Mr Thomas invigorating for a number of reasons. First and foremost, he is not scared of doing something unorthodox in the interests of simplifying and speeding up the game – I frequently disagree with individual manifestations of this, but at heart he is definitely my kind of wargamer. I have a slight difficulty with the fact that he often has several different approaches for the same period, and I am never sure just how tested and proven these rules are, but once you challenge accepted thinking the gloves are off, and all sorts of new and sacrilegious ideas spring to mind.

All right, Foy – enough preamble, already – what did you do for the ECW battle?

Well, first off I applied my recently-developed “brigade order” rule. An “order” (activation counter) may be placed against a single unit, or against a Leader/General figure – and in my ECW games the Leaders go down to brigade level. Thus far it looks rather like C&C. The ordered Unit or Leader may then move, fight, whatever. However, if the order is given to a Leader, and if he is attached to a combat unit under his own command, then a contiguous group of units from this same brigade may be activated by this single order. Thus my armies have broken out in rashes of coloured counters, to identify the various brigades, and the need to keep them together to take advantage of this feature (an effect I term “daisychaining” when explaining it to bemused visitors) forces the army commander to keep his army organised. If a unit gets separated from its brigade, it requires a separate order – perhaps it will be moved back into contact with the brigade. In broken ground, or if a unit in the middle of the line breaks, or if (heaven forfend) the brigadier stops a bullet, the additional hassle of keeping that brigade under control is considerable.

A more senior Leader may take command of a brigade (only one at a time) if the brigadier is lost. All Leaders attached to units are, of course, at risk if the unit takes losses.

OK – that’s not really all that new – I’ve mentioned this before, and bits of it are sort of derived from CCA. The new bit was the Activation rule. The “phasing” player (don’t you hate that?) is about to take his turn, and he arms himself with a handful of my patent blue ACTIVE counters and a D6.

He is only going to get to place a limited number of Activation counters, so he had better prioritise, and he had better be selective. He gets the first one for nothing – place a counter against any unit or leader he wishes.

It gets harder as he goes along. For his second order/counter, he must throw a 2 or better on the D6. If he gets 2+, he places a second counter, and then he must get 3+ to place a third. And so on – he may stop whenever he wishes, and if he doesn’t make the next number (or successfully places a 6^th counter) then he must stop. Yes it is crude – I am proud of how crude it is – but it works, on average it gives something like the number of Activation orders you might expect from C&C, but you don’t know how many until you find out the hard way. Ideal for a solo player - I found it easy, convenient and still with a good few stings in the tail. On four, possibly five occasions in the Battle of High Cark I decided to place an order against one of the C-in-Cs, to move him nearer to where he was needed (just in case). As soon as the C-in-C was identified, without fail, the D6 rolled a “1” and the C-in-C remained where he was. It became a bit of a joke – a sad, solo joke, but there you go.

For a bigger battle, I guess I might use a D8, or a D10, but the D6 might do for even very big actions if the brigade orders feature were available. Anyway, there’s the outline. I liked it the other day – it passed all my Stone Age tests. You can reject it out of hand, or improve on it, or try it out, or tell me that it actually appeared in an SPI game in 1978, but do – at least – think about it. Out of the mouths of fools and single-cell organisms cometh wisdom – when you are contemplating the unthinkably crude, you may come up with a few new wacky ideas of your own.

And, if you haven’t already, have a look at Neil Thomas – I read and shrugged at his Napoleonic book, and did pretty much the same with his One-Hour wargames book, but – by Gum – my mind was racing afterwards. Homeopathy for wargamers?    

ECW Campaign - Battle of High Cark, 4th April 1644

Sir Rowland Barkhill's Parliamentarian horse, attached to the Covenanter army,
take station on the right flank, at Mallinson's Farm

During Week 5 of the campaign, the Parliamentarian commander, Sir Henry Figge-Newton, ordered the Scottish troops under General Geddes to advance northwards from Pacefield, drive between the two Royalist forces (who were at Erneford and Lowther) and capture the ferry crossing over the River Arith at Cark, moving his men over to the north side of the river. Geddes, who had very few cavalry, was reinforced by the addition of most of a brigade of horse under the command of Sir Rowland Barkhill, whose troopers had been only lightly engaged at Midlawton.

Because of a quirk of the campaign system, this map has the southern
edge at the top, so the Scottish troops crossed the river and advanced down the page

Geddes carried this out quickly and efficiently, but found that there was no-one at the ferry and that the boats had been removed. His engineers built a temporary bridge and the soldiers crossed, but there was some confusion over what to do next. Geddes decided to advance to the east, but a Northumbrian Royalist force under Sir John Darracott was approaching behind him, having been warned that the Parliament men had crossed the river. Geddes’ scouts soon spotted the Royalists behind them, and the Scots turned about to meet them in the vicinity of Cark Hall – what was originally intended to be a movement to isolate the fortress of Erneford had turned into an encounter-type battle, within a mile or so of the ferry itself.

Darracott had brought along a medium cannon (a saker) from the fortress, but realised that he was outnumbered, and he arranged a defensive line, with his cavalry on his left. Geddes attacked all along his line, though it took a while to get his troops organised properly – he had the brigade of Colonel St Clair on his right, attacking a rocky hill, and the Earl of Dunbar attacking a more open position on his left, with Colonel Herdman’s brigade supporting that of the Earl.

The Royalist left held their position stoutly, and St Clair’s attack was repulsed, but things went less well on their right. Colonel Brogan was wounded fairly early in the action, and the resultant difficulty in co-ordinating the operations of his brigade was not helped by Sir John Darracott being cut off from the main action – he was forced to take personal evasive action to escape The Parliamentary cavalry, and he took little further part in the battle.  Brogan’s brigade were rolled up from their right, and, after a brief, stubborn defence of the rocky hill, Colonel Frayne (surprised to find himself now in effective command) ordered a withdrawal back to Erneford. The Royalists were harried by Barkhill’s horse during the retreat, and lost a good number of prisoners.

Col Edward Frayne (b.1608), of Beescombe Park,
near Ashington - commander by default

Royalist Force – General Sir John Darracott  - 4700 foot, 800 horse, 1 gun

Brigade of Col Edward Frayne

Regts of Foot of De la Roche, Wooding & Frayne

Brigade of Col Philip Brogan

Regts of Foot of Charlton, Fintry, Corfield & Brogan

Brigade of Col Henry Moorhouse

Regts of Horse of Moorhouse & Noden

1 medium artillery piece

Estimated losses approx 2000 foot, 600 horse; the solitary cannon was lost and Colonel Brogan was wounded, though he should recover fairly quickly.

General Geddes waves his hat in victory - mind you, he would wave it in defeat
too. Hat waving is what he does best.

Parliament Force – General Wm Geddes – 6000 foot, 1200 horse

Brigade of Col John St Clair

Regts of Foot of St Clair, Laird & Petrie

Brigade of Col Wm Herdman

Regts of Foot of Herdman, Yester & Sweeting

Brigade of the Earl of Dunbar

Regts of Foot of Snodgrass, McKinnon & Dunbar

Brigade of Sir Rowland Barkhill

Regts of Horse of South, Dundonald & Pitlochrie

Losses approx 1400 foot, 100 horse.

[Once again, the losses of both sides are inflated by a large proportion of missing troops, some of whom are expected to return to the colours.]

Detailed army returns for Week 5 will appear in a week or so.

General view at commencement, from behind the Royalist left

Sir Henry Moorhouse, with the Royalist horse, who had a difficult day

Geddes' Covenanters set off on their general advance, the horse nearest the camera,
then the brigades of St Clair, Herdman and the Earl of Dunbar

The Earl of Dunbar's brigade advance - not an elegant touch of ordre mixte, surely?

Col Frayne gets the Royalist left organised on the hill...

...and here you can see the attack coming, though it took a while to get into shape

Flat-pack engineering - the Scots' admirable temporary bridge; Pitlochrie Horse
and Cark Hall in the background

From behind the Parliamentary attack - Herdman (orange counters) is the reserve

Borrowed from the fortress at Erneford - a saker - complete waste of time -
never hit anything all afternoon, and was left behind in the retreat

Naturally there was a cavalry melée - Royalists nearer the camera

Brogan advances rather untidily to meet the Earl of Dunbar's men

Meanwhile, the Parliamentary horse roll some very useful dice

Frayne's brigade did an excellent job defending the hill on the Royalist left

While Brogan's men (without their wounded commander) did less well at the other end

This is just about the end of the day - Frayne withdrew what he could, but the
loss of the artillery battery provided the deciding Victory Point, and it was time to go

Frayne was left alone, defending his hill, surrounded by the enemy

Same view, different angle

ECW Campaign – Week 4

Barnabas Pobjoy, the formidable mayor of Midlawton, more than a match
for the unfortunate Lord Porteous

Some aspects of the week are also covered in the account of the Battle of Midlawton; what follows here is a summary.

The Parliamentarian army assembled in the area of Pacefield, and marched northwards towards Midlawton, where they were surprised by Lord Porteous, with all the troops he had available, but without the expected reinforcement under the command of General Sir John Darracott. The resultant Battle of Midlawton (28^th March 1644) is recorded in the histories as one of the great disasters of the Royalist cause – Porteous’ losses in killed wounded and missing were about 40% of his strength, he lost all his artillery and a number of his most able brigade commanders, and the wreck of his army fell back, as best they could, to Lowther. On reaching that town, with his army still strung out behind him in disorder, Lord Porteous announced that he was unwell, and retired to his quarters, leaving Lord Sefton in temporary command. Sefton had the challenge of doing what he could to organise some kind of army out of the bits, as more stragglers returned to their units.

Ralph Molyneux, Lord Sefton - commanding the Royalist
"Army of North Lonsdale" during the indisposition of Lord Porteous

Word soon reached Darracott, at Woodhouses with the supporting force seconded from the Marquis of Newcastle, of the catastrophe at Midlawton, and he ordered his troops forward to the fortress town of Erneford, to cover Porteous’ retreat.

Sir John Darracott - commander of the forces from
Northumberland

The victorious Sir Henry Figge-Newton handed over command of the Army of Parliament to Sir Nathaniel Aspinall (who was the actual field commander during the battle) and retired to Pacefield, to meet up with the Scottish Covenanter forces under Gen William Geddes (“Big Willie Geddes” to his men – Gen Geddes was a giant of a man, apparently – “six and a half” feet tall).

"Big Willie" Geddes - in command of the Scottish forces
seconded to Parliament

Aspinall duly took possession of the town of Midlawton (a situation he cannot have expected), including a portion of the baggage train of Royalist Army, with one of the treasure chests and much of that army’s correspondence and records, and he also acquired 4 good field pieces in working order, plus a mass of other abandoned weapons and ammunition. The mayor of Midlawton, Mr Barnabas Pobjoy, was keen to place his town at the disposal of Parliament, subject to some guarantees about the behaviour of the soldiers. He found Aspinall to be a rather more combative negotiator than Porteous had been, but he was also famed for his intolerance toward looting and any other ungodly activity in his army, and a gallows was promptly erected in the town market to emphasise what was expected of the soldiery. General Aspinall made it clear that the gallows would also be used to deal with any official or citizen of the town who caused any trouble or provided information to the enemy.

The Midlawton Town Guard (trained band without firearms) was taken into the Parliament army, and Aspinall appointed a new officer of his own to command it.

A large proportion of the losses on both sides at the Battle of Midlawton consisted of men who had gone missing – some of the Royalists were bona fide prisoners, but a great many had simply run away from the combat. The situation after the battle was complicated. Many of the Royalist units were raised in Cumberland and Westmorland, to the north, and – though many took shelter with sympathetic locals, or just disappeared – the best-supplied and quickest way home for these men was probably to rejoin their army in the retreat.

On the other hand, many of Aspinall’s soldiers had been recruited in Blackburn, Salford, West Derby and other areas well to the south, and the official orders forbidding collection of any booty from Midlawton brought a rush of desertions – many felt that the battle was won, the campaign must now be over, the immediate prospects for life in the army did not appear attractive, and they would be best setting off for home. Aspinall quickly detailed some of his units of horse to patrol the tracks heading south in search of deserters, but they had little success – they had too much ground to cover, and the situation was not helped by the fact that some of the troopers took the opportunity to desert also.

The consequence of all this was that the proportion of missing men who rejoined the colours after the battle was rather higher in the defeated army, which seems counterintuitive but was nonetheless true.

A pre-war portrait of Sir Roderick Broadhurst, hero
of Hobden's Mill, whose brigade of the Royalist horse
was practically destroyed at Midlawton

Royalist

Force A (Lord Porteous with the brigades of Rice, Fulwood & Parkfield, at Lowther), Force B (Lord Sefton with a detached force at Midlawton) and Force D (Col Broadhurst, with a cavalry force at Erneford) were ordered to garrison the town of Midlawton. This was compromised by the refusal of the Mayor of Midlawton to allow more troops into the town, followed by the unfortunate battle on 28^th – afterwards these forces merged into a revised Force A (Lord Sefton in acting command, with Porteous indisposed) and fell back to the area of Lowther.

Force F (Genl Darracott, with the reinforcement from the Marquis of Newcastle) had orders to rest until 5^th February at Woodhouses, but on hearing of the defeat at Midlawton he marched his troops to Erneford, the old fortress on the River Arith, to cover Porteous’ retreat.

Parliament

The various columns converged on Pacefield, and marched north, where they were engaged in battle at Midlawton. Following the battle, the victorious forces were merged into revised Force A, at Midlawton, under the command of Genl Aspinall (Genl Figge-Newon having left to join the Scots…)

Force I - General Geddes’ Covenanters marched from Briskhill to Pacefield.